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FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT

COVERAGE OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Malcolm M. Davisson*
The writer published an article dealing with the coverage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act1 in the June, 1943 issue of the Michigan
Law Review.2 It is the purpose of this paper to consider the most
important decisions since the preparation of that article (March, 1943)
and to examine the applicability of the act to certain activities not there
discussed.
The minimum wage [ 6 (a)] and maximum hour [ 7 (a)] provisions
of the act apply to employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 8 No all-embracing formula has been laid
down by the courts to determine when employees are so engaged. The
act does not provide for blanket coverage of industries as a whole; the
test of coverage is the relation of the activities of the individual employee to interstate commerce or to the production of goods for interstate commerce rather than the nature of the employer's business; 4
and since this test is related to the nature of the activities of the particular employee, some employees of a given industry or of a given employer may be covered and others may be outside the scope of the
act. Similarly, some employees may be covered at one time but, when
engaged in other activities, may not be within the act. In view of the
employee test of coverage, any attempt to evolve an all-embracing
formula would be futile because of the wide variety of organizational
patterns and the multitudinous types of economic activity found in large
segments of modern business. Rather the scope of the act can be determined only by the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion applied
to a wide variety of fact situations.

*

A.B., University of California; Ph.D., Harvard University; J.D., University
of Michigan Law School. Chairman, Department of Economics, University of California.
1
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (1940), § 201 et. seq.
2
Davisson, Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1060
(1943).
8
52 Stat. L. 1062, 1063 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 206 (a), 207 {a).
'Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, 63 S. Ct.. 332 (1943); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S. Ct. 125 (1942); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. u16 (1942).
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I
EMPLOYEES "ENGAGED IN COMMERCE"

The act defines "commerce" [3 (b)] as meaning "trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States
or from any State to any place outside thereof." 5 This definition is narrower than that of "produced" [ 3 (j)] which means "produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on in any
State; and for the purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed
to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was
employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any process
or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any State." 6
. In Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation,7 the Supreme Court
said:
" ... In arriving at that [Congressional] intent it must be remembered that Congress did not choose to exert its power to the
full by _regulating industries and occupations which affect interstate
commerce. . . . But the policy of Congressional abnegation with
respect to occupations affecting commerce is no reason for narrowly
circumscribing the phrase 'engaged in commerce.' We said in the
Jacksonville Paper Co. case, ... 'It is clear that the purpose of the
Act was to extend federal control in this field throughout the
farthest reaches of the channels of interstate commerce.' " 8

,

The decision of the Supreme Court in McLeod v. Threlkeld 9 suggests, however, that the broad doctrine enunciated in the Overstreet
case is to be qualified and that "engaged in commerce" is to be construed more narrowly than "production of goods for commerce."
In the Overstreet case, the question before the Supreme Court was
whether employees engaged in maintaining or operating a toll road
and a drawbridge over a navigable waterway which together constituted a medium for the interstate movement of goods and persons were
"engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the act. The Court
concluded that there was no persuasive reason why the scope of employed or engaged "in commerce" laid down in Pedersen v. Delaware,
5

52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 203 (b).
52 Stat. L. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 203 (j). Italics are the
author's.
7
318 U.S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943).
8
318 U.S. 125 at 128, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943).
9
319 U.S. 491, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
6
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Lackawanna & Wes tern Railroad Company 10 and related cases 11 arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 12 should not be applied
to similar language in the Fair Labor Standards Act, especially when
Congress in adopting the phrase "engaged in commerce" had those
Liability Act cases called to its attention.18 Among the related cases
cited by the Court was Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington Railroad
Company v. Smith 14 in which a cook employed by a railroad transporting interstate shipments to prepare meals for a gang of carpenters
repairing bridges along its lines was held to be employed in interstate
commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. Following the test of the Pedersen and related cases, the Court
construed the phrase "engaged in commerce" to include employees
whose work was so intimately related to interstate commerce "as to be
in practice and in legal contemplation a part of it" and held that employees maintaining or operating a toll road and a drawbridge over
a navigable waterway which together constituted a medium for the
interstate movement of goods and persons were "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the act.
The McLeod case involved a cook employed by a commissary
company to prepare meals for maintenance-of-way employees of an
interstate railway carrier with which the commissary company had a
'contract to furnish meals. The facts were thus identical with those of
the Smith case, except that the cook was employed by an independent
contractor rather than by the railroad itself as in the Smith case. It·
was urged on behalf of McLeod that the Court had decided in the
Smith case that an employee engaged in similar work was "in commerce" under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and that it was
immaterial whether the employee was hired by the one engaged in
the interstate business since it js the activities of the employee and not
10

229 U. S. 146, 33 S. Ct. 648 (1912).
Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Di Donato, 256 U.S. 327, 41 S. Ct. 516 (1921);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 251 U. S. 259, 40 S. Ct. 130
(1920); Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 130, 39 S. Ct. 412
(1919); Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Smith, 250 U. S. 101, 39 S. Ct. 396
(1919); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168, 39 S. Ct. 188 (1919);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U.S. 571, 37 S. Ct. 703 (1917).
12
35 St. L. 65 (1908), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 51 et seq. Before amendment in
1939., 53 Stat. L. 1404 (1939), the act applied only where the injury· was suffered
while the carrier was engaging in interstate or foreign commerce and the injured employee was employed by the carrier in such commerce.
18
318 U.S. 125 at 131-132, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943).
u 250 U.S. IOI, 39 S. Ct. 396 (1919).
11
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of the employer which are decisive.15- The majority of the Court took
the position that, while there is no single concept of interstate commerce
which can be applied to every federal statute regulating commerce, the
test of the Federal Employers' Liability Act that activities so closely
related to interstate transportation as to be in practice and legal relation
a part thereof are -to be considered in that commerce is applicable to
employments "in commerce" under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The majority opinion then stated that where the accident occurs on
or in direct connection with the instrumentalities of transportation,
interstate commerce has been used interchangeaply with interstate
,transportation, citing the Pedersen case; but where the distinction between what a common carrier by railroad does while engaging in
commerce between the states-i.e., transportation-and interstate commerce in general is important, the Federal Employers' Liability Act
was construed prior to the 1939 amendment as applying to transportation only. The Court here cited Shanks 'U. Delaware, Lackawanna & ,
Western Railroad Company 16 and subsequent cases following it. In
the Shanks case, an employee in a machine shop operated~by a railroad
company for repair of locomotives used in both interstate and intrastate
transportation was held not to be employed in interstate commerce
within the meaning 'of the Federal Employers' Liability Act while
putting into a new location a countershaft through which power was
communicated to some of the machinery in the repair shop, since his
work was too remote from interstate transportation to be practically
a part of it. The reasoning of the Shanks case was followed subsequently in Chicago & North Western Railway Company 'U, Bolle,11
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company ·'U. Industrial Commission of Illinois, and New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Company 'U. Bezu.19
· The Court then referred to the holding in the_ Smith case that a
15

319 U.S. 491 at 494, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
239 U.S. 556, 36 S. Ct. 188 (1916).
17 284 U.S. 74, 52 S. Ct. 59 (1931). The Court held that a fireman on a loco.
motive engine attached to other engines which were taking on coal was not engaged in
interstate commerce where his engine was used to generate steam to heat a depot and
passenger coaches in yards.
'
18
284 U.S. 296, 52 S. Ct. 151 (1932). An employee injured while oiling an
electric motor furnishing power to hoist coal into a chute from which it was taken by
locomotives moving interstate freight was held not engaged in interstate· commerce.
19 284 U.S. 415, 52 S. Ct. 205 (1932). An unskilled roundhouse laborer injured while working on a locomotive temporarily removed from service for repairs was
held not engaged in interstate commerce.
16
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cook employed by an interstate railroad to prepare meals for a gang of
carpenter$ repairing bridges along its lines was employed in interstate
commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
and said:
"Such a ruling under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
after the Bolte, Industrial Corwmission, and Bezue cases . . .
should not govern our conclusions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. These three later cases limited the coverage of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act to the actual operation of transportation and acts so closely related to transportation as to be
themselves really a part of it. They recognized the fact that railroads carried commerce and were thus a part of it but that each
employment that indirectly assisted the functioning of that transportation was not a part. The test under this present act, to determine whether an employee is engaged in commerce, is not whether
the employee's activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate
commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related to
the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it. Employee
activities outside of this movement, so far as they are covered by
wage-hour regulation, are governed by the other phrase, 'production of goods for commerce.'" 20
Applying this test, the majority concluded that the furnishing of
board seemed as remote from commerce as in the cases where employees
supply themselves, since in one instance the food would be as necessary
for the continuance of their labor as in the other. Accordingly, it was
held that the cook employed by a commissary company to prepare
meals for maintenance-of-way employees of an interstate railway carrier was not "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy, joined
in by Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge, it was argued that the
activities of McLeod in cooking for a traveling maintenance crew of an
interstate railroad were sufficient to satisfy the Overstreet test ( derived
from the Pedersen and Smith cases) of whether the activities of the
employee are so closely related to interstate commerce "~s to be in
practice and in legal contemplation a part of it." The rejection of this
test for the narrower one of whether the employee is engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically
a part of it laid down in the Shanks, Bolte, Industrial Cormrussion, and
20

319 U.S. 491 at 496-497, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
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B ezue cases was regarded as wrong, since the F~ir Labor Standard Act
extends to employees "engaged in commerce" and not merely to those
engaged in transportation. Whatever basis there may have been for
restricting coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to employees actually engaged in transportation because of the fact that the
act applied only to those working for employers engaged in interstate
transportation by rail can have no bearing on interpretation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act whose coverage is much more extensive. Nor did
the dissenting members of the Court find anything in the latter act to
suggest that it has a narrower application to employees whose work
"in commerce" is transportation or work connected therewith than it
has to employees engaged in commerce but whose work has nothing
to do with transportation. "Such a construction is untenable because it
would discriminate without reason between different types of employees, all of whom fall-within the same general statutory classification of
'engaged in commerce.' The necessary effect of rejecting the Smith
case for the restrictive concept of 'in commerce' which was used in the
Shanks, Balle, Commission, and Bezue cases is to introduce into the
administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act that concededly undesirable confusion which characterized the application of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act and prompted the 1939 amendment . . .
which in effect repudiated the narrow test of the Shanks line of cases." 21
While the majority opinion in the McLeod case does not state expressly that the test of whether an employee is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the act is more exacting than the test of whether
an employee is engaged in production of goods for commerce, the language is such as to suggest that the former phrase is to be construed
more narrowly than the latter. That the dissenting members of the
Court so interpreted the majority opinion is suggested by the following
language:
" ... The purpose of the 'production of goods for commerce'
phrase was obviously not to cut down the scope of 'engaged in
commerce,' but to broaden the Act's application by reaching conditions in the production of goods for commerce which Congress
considered injurious to interstate commerce ... The effect of the
Court's decision to-day, however, is to recognize that federal
power over commerce has been sweepingly exercised when an employee's work is in the production of goods for commerce, but to
limit it, when the employee's activities are in transportation or
21

319 U.S. 491 at 499-500, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
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connected therewith, to the narrow and legislatively repudiated
view of the Shanks, Bolle, Commission and Bezue cases. Such an
unbalanced application of the statute is contrary to its purpose of
affording coverage broadly 'throughout the farthest reaches of the
channels of interstate commerce' to employees 'engaged in commerce.' " 22
Narrower construction of "engaged in commerce" is further indicated in the recent decision in Armour & Co. v. Wantock 28 involving
auxiliary firemen employed by a soap manufacturer doing interstate
business. The Court there said:

"McLeod v. Threlkeld, ... which did exclude the employee
from the scope of the Act, is not in point here because it involved
application of the other clause of the Act, covering employees
engaged 'in commerce,' and the test of whether one is in commerce is obviously more exacting than the test of whether his occupation is necessary to production for commerce." 24
This position has significant implications for the large number of
workers who are engaged neither in the physical processes of production of goods for interstate commerce nor in processes or occupations
necessary to such production, but whose claim to the benefits of the act
must rest on their being "engaged in commerce." Among this group
are (I) employees in the distributive trades; ( 2) employees performing maintenance and service activities in buildings housing tenants engaged in interstate commerce but not producing goods for such commerce on the premises; and (3) employees constructing, operating,
maintaining, and repairing instrumentalities of interstate commerce.

A. Employees in the Distributive Trades
Employees ordering, transporting, checking, and unloading goods
imported from other states and employees who participate in the sale
of goods to customers in other states and in the delivery of such goods
from the employer's warehouse to out-of-state customers are "engaged
in commerce" within the meaning of the act.25 It is in connection with
those employees whose co~tact with goods of out-of-state origin occurs
between receipt at the employer's warehouse and subsequent delivery
22

319 U.S. 491 at 502, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
(U. S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 165.
24
(U. S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 165 at 167-168.
25
See 4·1 M1cH. L. REV. 1060 at 1067 (1943) for extensive citation of cases
involving employees performing these activities.
28
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to local customers or, in the case of a chain store organization, to the
employer's own local retail outlets that the "twilight zone of uncertainty" exists; and it is with those employees that this section is concerned. In determining whether such employees are "engaged in commerce," the question is whether the goods they handle in the warehouse
and prepare for local distribution, and in connection with which they
do necessary clerical work, remain in the stream of interstate commerce
until they reach their ultimate destination-the local retail outlet.or whether the goods complete their interstate journey when they
come to rest in the warehouse of the independent wholesaler or chain
store organization so that any subsequent activity in connection with
them is purely intrastate and consequently outside the scope of the
act. The majority of earlier decisions, following a "state of rest" or
"prior order" theory, took the latter position.26
The cases coming before the courts involve principally two types
of fact situations: (I) where goods are imported from other states' by
a wholesale ·distributor for subsequent local distribution to independent
retail outlets and ( 2) where goods are imported from other states by
a chain store organization for subsequent local distribution to its own
retail outlets. A third'type of situation which has arisen less frequently
is where an out-of-state manufacturer or supplier delivers goods to his
local distributing agency for subsequent sale to local custom~rs.

E~ployees of Independent Wholesalers
The first type of fact situation, involving importation of goods from
other states by an independent wholesaler for subsequent distributjon
to local customers, came before the Supreme Court in Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Company. 21 The act was held to cover employees
a "substantial part" of whose activities involved (I) procurement or
receipt of goods from other states; and ( 2) handling or delivering to
local customers goods of out-of-state origin pursuant to either special
orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers. In
the case of special orders, the Court argued that there was a practical
continuity of movement of the goods until they reached the customers
for whom they were intended and entry of goods into the warehouse
interrupted but did not necessarily terminate their interstate journey.
"A temporary pause in their transit does not mean that they are no
longer 'in commerce' within the meaning of the Act ... if the halt in
I.

28

See 41 MxcH. L. REV. 1060 at 1067-1069 (1943) .
317 U.S. 564, 63 S. Ct. 332 (1943). See also Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317
U.S. 572, 63 S. Ct. 337 (1943).
. 27
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the movement of the goods is a convenient intermediate step in the
process of getting them to their final destinations, they remain 'in
commerce' until they reach those points." 28 In extending the "prior
order" doctrine to include goods ordered pursuant to pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers, the Court argued that such
transactions could not be distinguished from special orders-the former, like the latter, indicate where it is intended the terminal point of
interstate movement should be. Nor here will a temporary break in
physical continuity of transit at the wholesaler's· warehouse be sufficient
to end the interstate journey at the warehouse.
As to the balance of the goods not purchased on special orders fro~
customers nor ordered pursuant to pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers, the Court rejected the Administrator's contention
that, since most of the customers formed a fairly stable group and
orders were recurrent as to kind and amount so that the needs of the
trade could be estimated with considerable precision, business with these
customers was "in commerce" within the meaning of the act. However,
the Court said:
" ... We do not mean to imply that a whplesaler's course of
business based on anticipation of needs of specific customers, rather
than on prior orders or contracts, might not at times be sufficient
to establish that practical continuity in transit necessary to keep a
movement of goods 'in commerce' within the meaning of the Act.
. . . We do not believe, however, that on this phase of the case such
a course of business is revealed by this record. The evidence said
to support it is of a wholly general character and lacks that particularity necessary to show that the goods in question were different from goods acquired and held by a local merchant for local
disposition." 29
The Court did not indicate further what course of business would
be sufficient to establish "practical continuity in transit necessary to keep
a movement of goods 'in commerce'" and it has not subsequently decided this question.80
A number of independent wholesaler cases 81 have been decided by
28

317 U.S. 564.at 568, 63 S. Ct. 332 (1943).
317 U.S. 564 at 570, 63 S. Ct. 332 (1943).
so See Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 64 S. Ct. 826 (1944).
81 Walling v. Silver Bros., (C. C. A. 1st, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 168; Schwarz v.
Witwer Grocery Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 341, cert. denied 322 U. S.
753, 64 S. Ct. 1265 (1944); Lorber v. Resow, (D. C. Conn. 1944) 8 Wage and
Hour Reporter 21 (hereafter cited as W. H. Rep.); Walling v. Bridgeport Tobacco
29
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lower federal courts since the Jacksonville Paper Company case; but
these cases either did not involve questions requiring consideration of
what course of business on the part of an independent wholesaler would
be sufficient to establish "practical continuity in transit necessary to keep
a movement of goods 'in commerce'" when goods are not purchased
pursuant to special orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings
with customers or, if this was considered, the opinions give little indication of what factors bearing upon the wholesaler's course of business
will ~e regarded as material.
An important segment of the independent wholesaler problem thus
remains unsettled. In the absence of special orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers, final determination of the
status of employees of an independent wholesaler whose activities are
performed in .connection with goods of out-of-state origin between
receipt at the wholesaler's warehouse and subsequent local distribution must await further clarification of what course of business will
keep a movement of goods "in commerce" after receipt at the wholesaler's warehouse.·
2.

Employees of Chain Store Organizations

The Supreme Court has not as yet decided any cases involving the
second type of fact situation where goods are imported from other
states by a chain store organization for subsequent distribution to its
own local retail outlets. However, a number of such ·cases have been
decided by lower federal courts.
In Walling v. Goldblatt Brothers,32 defendant owned and operated
three warehouses in Chicago at which it received merchandise of outof-state origin and from which it thereafter distributed goods to its
own chain of department stores, located in Illinois and Indiana. After
goods had been unloaded and checked, they were either moved immediately to the outgoing platform and from there sent to one of defendant's department stores or to customers or were placed in the appropriate department of the warehouse to be stored until ordered out to
one of the retail stores. Sofne manufacturing operations were carried
on in certain of the warehouses. The circuit court of appeals held within
Co., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 429; Fellabaum v. Swift & Co., (D. C. Ohio 1944)
54 F. Supp. 353; Walling v. R. L. McGinley Co., (D. C Tenn. 1943) 7 W. H. Rep.
93; Ouendag v. Gibson, (D. C. Mi~h. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 379.
32 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) IZ8 F. (2d) 778, cert. denied 318 U.S. 757, 63 S. Ct.
528 (1943). Certiorari was denied subsequent to the decisions in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co. and Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S. Ct. 332 (1943).
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the scope of the act employees whose activities related to procurement
of extrastate goods, unloading of such goods at the warehouses, checking of such goods prior to the time they came to rest on the unloading
platforms, manufacture of goods for shipment out-of-state, shipment
of goods out-of-state, and maintenance and operation of warehouses
where production for commerce occurred. As to employees moving
goods from unloading platforms into the warehouses, storing them,
delivering them to defendant's local stores, and doing clerical work
involved in such storage and delivery, the court rejected the argument
that these activities were merely part of the "stream of commerce" from
the place of origin of the goods to defendant's retail stores and held
that once the goods reached the warehouses, they assumed a wholly
local character so that employees concerned solely with subsequent
moving and storing of goods in the warehouses and shipment of goods
from warehouses to local stores were not "engaged in commerce." The
Court argued that while defendant knew in advance from its records,
in a general way, the needs of the retail stores and ordered accordingly,
it did not rely upon existing orders from its stores or customers. In the
absence of prior orders, imported goods, not destined for any specific
customer or store, came to rest upon arrival at the warehouses.88
A di:fferent result was reached by another circuit court of appeals
in Walling v. American Stores Company 84 involving a large chain store
organization operating approximately 2,300 retail stores in several
states supplied from warehouses which received and stocked products
manufactured and processed by the company itself, private label items
produced and packed expressly for it, and items of other manufacturers.
Four of the warehouses made deliveries only to defendant's stores in
the state where the warehouse was located. The lower court held that
certain employees of these warehouses who did not participate in handling of out-of-state goods nor in shipment of goods to defendant's
subsidiaries were not engaged in commerce. The circuit court of appeals
reversed, holding that there was such a "practical continuity of movement" as to bring these warehouse employees within the act. The court
pointed out that there was a fairly even flow of goods through the
warehouses and that it was defendant's policy to avoid overstocking.
Buyers ordered in anticipation of regular and continuous requirements
of the retail st9res, guided by past experience with allowance for seasonal factors and merchandising programs. The evidence, the Court
88
See Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 255, discussed
supra at p. 876.
8;i (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 840.
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argued, went beyond that of a "wholly general character" involved in
the Jacksonville Paper Company case. It stressed, further, that the
problem here was not (as in the Jacksonville Paper Company case)
that of an independent wholesaler; rather the entire operation from
the pur_chase, processing, or manufacture of goods to the ultimate sale
to retail purchasers was that of the American Stores Company. There
was nothing comparable, therefore, to "goods acquired and held by a
local merchant for local disposition" referred to in the Jacksonville
Paper Co~pany case. The warehouses here were maintained not to
break the continuity of movement of goods until they reached defendant's retail stores, but rather ~o make it even, economical, and uninterrupted. In referring to the narrower view of the Goldblatt case, the
court said:
_, "· .. · This conclusion may go somewhat beyond that ... in
Walling v. Goldblatt Bros.... But the court in that case did not
have the advantage of the guidance given by the Suprem\;! Court
decisions of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co. and Higgins v.
Carr Bros. Co." 85
Courts deciding subsequent cases involving employees of warehouses operated by chain store organizations have divided between
the positions of the Goldblatt 86 and the American Stores Company 81
85

133 F. (2d) 840 at 846.
ln Walling v. L. Wiemann Co. (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 602, cert.
denied 321 U.S. 785, 64 S. Ct. 782 (1944), decided by the same court deciding the
Goldblatt case, employees in a warehouse maintained for receipt and storage of merchandise for later distribution to defendant chain of retail stores were held not to be
engaged in commerce. After referring to the contrary holding of the American Stores
case, the court said: "If the decision in the American Stores case be construed as supporting the broad doctrine that after goods in interstate commerce have come to rest
within the state of destination, they remain, nevertheless, in interstate commerce merely
because th,ey are intended to be moved again at some time to retail stores in the same
state, it would seem that the case stands alone without support of other authority." 138
F. (2d) 602 at 605. Employees engaged in delivering goods to local customers after
they were stored in the warehouses of a chain store organization were held not engaged
in commerce in Allesandro v. C. F. Smith Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 75.
See also Vogelpohl v. Lane Drug Co., (D. C. Ohio 1944) 55 F. Supp. 564; Walling
v. Ward's Cut-Rate Drugs, (D. C.'Tex. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 41.
87
A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, (C. C. A. 1st, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 102, cert.
granted (U. S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 268. In Walling v•. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply
Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 331, a wholesale grocery firm (Mutual) was
organized to serve a chain of retail grocery stores (Thomas) which were required by
contract to secure all their merchandise from this wholesale firm. The court found that
the great bulk of Mutual's businc:ss was carried on to meet the needs of one customer
(Thomas) and that a very substantial portion of that business consisted of interstate
86
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cases. There is still uncertainty, therefore, as to coverage of such employees. The "practical continuity of movement" test of the Jacksonville Paper Company case1 although there stated with respect to an
independent wholesaler, would seem equally applicable to' the chain
store situation. Whether the warehouse is operated by a wholesaler,
with goods moving to independent retail outlets, or by a chain store
organization, with goods moving to its own retail outlets, would not
by itself seem to be controlling; the basic q~estion in both situations
is whether the "course of business" is such as to establish continuity
of movement of goods through the warehouse to local retail outlets
or whether there is such a break in the interstate journey as will reasonably warrant a holding that the goods have come to rest even
though they are intended to be moved again at some time to retail
stores in the same state.
Determination of whether there is "practical continuity of movement" necessary to keep goods of out-of-state origin "in commerce"
within the meaning of the act is complicated by variations in the "course
of business" among independent wholesalers and among integrated
chain store organizations. Among the factors of importance in the case
of the independent wholesaler are the kinds of goods carried; the
nature of the clientele; the geographical area over which the wholesaler operates; the extent to which the wholesaler himself carries surplus stocks instead of buying from ·suppliers on a "hand-to-mouth"
basis; the type of enterprise-whether the wholesaler operates as a
service wholesaler whose salesmen call upon the retail trade and who
extends credit to retail customers or as a cash and carry wholesaler or
whether he has contractual arrangements with independent retailers
shipped goods ordered for and distributed to that customer. In this situation, interstate
shipments of goods remained in the channels of interstate commerce until delivered at
the Thomas stores and all employees who devoted a substantial part of their time to
ordering, receipt, care, and distribution of such interstate goods to Thomas stores were
engaged in commerce. "We are not to be understood as determining generally that all
operators of warehouses come within the Act if a substantial part of the goods cared
for by them for others are received from, held or sent out (on orders of owners) into
interstate commerce. The problem of independent warehousemen is not here involved.
We confine our decision to the situation here which is that this warehouse was the
wholesale link in an integrated business moving interstate goods from manufacturers or
other wholesalers to the stores of a particular contract customer who retailed those goods.
It was created to be and w:is an agency in the course of and to effectuate this movement
in interstate commerce within the Act." 141 F. (2d) 331 at 339. See also Walling
v. Block, (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 268, cert. denied 321 U. S. 788, 64
S. Ct. 787 (1944); Ackerman v. Baltimore Markets, (D. C. Pa. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep.
168.
-
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to supply their needs on a planned basis; and the procedure of the
wholesaler as to ordering-whether he follows a relatively routine
procedure of placing orders with suppliers when stock on hand, as
indicated by the stock control system, reaches a certain point or whether
he gears his ordering more nearly to the anticipatory demands of his
clientele. In the case of the integrated chain store organization, the
clientele is a controlled group-the organization's own retail outletsand generally the destination of out-of-state goods would appear to
be known in advance with a reasonable degree of certainty. But here
too variations as to procedure with respect to accumulation of surplus
stocks and ordering exist, so that no one "course of business" can be
regarded as typical.
In the absence of prior orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers, the reasoning of the courts in cases dealing
with. warehouse employees of independent wholesalers and chain store
organizations, based upon the physical concepts involved in the "state
of rest" and. "prior order" doctrines as modified by the Jacksonville
Paper Company case, would appear to require analysis of the "course
of business" presented by each fact situation to determine whether
there is that particularity of evidence necessary to· show that the goods
in connection with which the employees' activities are performed are
di:fferent from "goods acquired and held by a local merchant for local
disposition." The determination of coverage on such a case-by-case
basis precludes laying down any all-embracing rule, at least until a
large number of different courses of business have been considered by
the courts.
The status of employees in the nonretail selling units of a chain
store organization-e.g. employees in warehouses and central officesis further complicated by the exemption provisions of the act.88 The
act provides that the minimum wage ahd maximum hour provisions of
the act shall not apply with respect to any employee employed in a
bona fide local rytailing capacity [ I 3 (a) (I)] or any employee engaged in any retail or service establishment the greater part of whose
selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce [ I 3 (a) ( 2)] .89 Under
j

88
52 Stat. L. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940) § 213. While there is a distinction, technically, between coverage of the act and exemption from specific provisions
of the act, certain of the exemptions provided in § 13(a) are discussed here to indicate
further the complications involved in the chain store cases.
39
52 Stat. L. 1067 (1938), 29 U. C. (1940), § 213 (a). In the case of independent concerns, the application of the exemption provisions of §§ 13 (a) (1) and
13(a) (2) have also created troublesome questions, since a clear-cut distinction between
0
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the retail or service establishment exemption,40 the criterion used is the
nature of the establishment in which the employee is engaged, so that
if the exemption is applicable because the greater part of the selling
or servicing of the retail or service establishment is in intrastate commerce, all employees engaged in the establishment are exempted from
the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the act.n
The Administrator 42 has taken the position that a retail establishment is characterized by numerous small sales, typically of consumer
goods, to private individuals for personal or family consumption and
not for resale or redistribution in any form.' 8 It is patronized regularly
by the general consuming public in contrast to a wholesale establishment which characteristically excludes the general consuming public
and confines its sales to other wholesalers, retailers, and large-scale
industrial or business purchasers. Distribution of goods from a chain
store warehouse to its retail outlets is not regarded as retail distribution
and the warehouse is not a retail estabHshment; nor will the fact that
distribution from the warehouse to the retail stores does not involve
a "sale" in the strict legal sense alter the nonretail character of the
distribution.44
The Administrator has interpreted the word "establishment" as
meaning ordinarily a physical place of business and it is not regarded
wholesaling and retailing is not always easy. See Harris v. Hammond, (C. C. A. 5th,
1944) 145 F. (2d) 333; Cron v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., (D. C. Tenn.
1943) 49 F. Supp. rn13; Petway v. Dobson, (D. C. Tenn. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 277;
Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 40.
40
The exemption with respect to any employee employed in a bona fide local
retailing capacity [13(a) (1)] has been involved less frequently. See, however, Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 255. This exemption will not
be considered further.
n The Administrator has taken the position that the greater part of the selling or
servicing of an establishment will be considered in intrastate commerce for purposes of
§ 13(a) (2) if more than 50 per cent of the total gross receipts of the establishment
is derived from intrastate sales or services. Selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce
if all the elements of the sale or service take place in the state in which the establishment
is located, irrespective of the source of the goods and the retail or nonretail character
of the transaction. 1942 W. H. Man. 338-339.
42
The exemption for retail or service establishments [§ 13(a) (2)] does not provide for definition of terms by the Administrator. The interpretations of the Wage
and Hour Division are merely intended to guide the Administrator until authoritative
rulings to the contrary are issued by the courts. Interpretative Bull. 6, 1942 W. H.
Man. 327.
43
See White Motor Co. v. Littleton, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 92;
Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 90; Zehring
v. Brown Materials Ltd., (D .• C. Cal. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 740.
44
Interpretative Bull.·6, 1942 W. H. Man. 328-330.
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as synonymous with the words "business" or "enterprise" as applied
to multi-unit companies. In the case of chain store systems, branch
stores, groups of independent retailers organized to carry on business
in a manner similar to chain store systems, and retail outlets of large
manufacturing or distributing concerns, ordinarily each physically separated unit is to be considered a separate establishment. In the view of
the Administrator, the exempt;on does not apply to warehouses, central
executive offices, manufacturing or processing plants, or other nonretail selling units distributing to or serving retail stores.45
In tp.e American Stores Company case, involving an integrated
organization operating retail stores, warehouses, canneries, a coffee
roasting plant, and a food processing and manufacturing plant, it was
urged that employees not employed in retail stores were exempt within
the meaning of section 13(a) (2) of the act. In rejecting this contention, the Court argued that "from: the standpoint of business integration,
it might conceivably be assumed that this whole enterprise is an 'establishment.' However, it is quite another thing to say that it is a retail
establishment when it engages in so many important operations other
than retailing, even though the retail sale is the event from which the
defendant's income is derived." 46 After reviewing the legislative history of section I 3 (a) ( 2), the court said:
" ... A multi-state business structure engaged in manufacturing and processing food products, warehousing and distribution of
food items to over 2000 retail stores is not at all comparable to the
intrastate 'local' or 'corner grocery man,' 'druggist,' 'meat dealer,'
'filling station man' or even 'department store' about whom the
legislators were concerned. They are totally dissimilar whether
the standards of comparison be economic, functional, or physical." 47
A similar result was reached in A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling. 46
It was there held, in answer to the contention that "establishment"
meant the entire business organization of the chain store system, that
the central office and warehouse was a different type of place than the
retail stores, since no sales were made there and there was no direct
contact with customers. Each retail store constituted a separate estab45

lnterpretative Bull. 6, 1942 W. H. Man. 335-338.
133 F. (2d) 840 at 842-843.
47
133 F. (2d) 840 at 844.
48
(C. C. A. 1st, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 102, cert. granted (U. S. 1944) 65 S. Ct.
46
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lishment where final disposition of merchandise was made by sale
to customers. The central office and warehouse also constituted a separate establishment where the managerial activities of the whole enterprise were carried on. They were distinct and separate units, although
together they made up the entire organization. The court concluded
that when a chain store system not only operates retail stores but also
buys in large quantities with a central point of receipt and distribution
in the nature of a wholesaler, it can no .longer be considered a retail
establishment within the meaning of section I 3 (a) ( 2).
The Administrator's contention has been rejected, however, in a
number of cases 49 which have held that the retail stores of a chain
system together with its general offices and warehouses constitute a
single retail establishment. The reasoning of these cases appears to be
that warehousing, servicing, or processing of goods, together with clerical activities, are merely incidental operations necessary to large-scale
distribution at retail and that the "retail establishment" includes the
warehouses and central offices which are but adjuncts, regardless of
whether the retailer operates one retail store or a multi-unit establishment with segregated warehouses. Several of the cases 50 distinguish
the American Stores Company case on the ground that there the company was operating canneries, a bottling works, manufacturing and
processing plants, a dairy, and a coffee plantation, so that the warehouses and other activities were not mere adjuncts of a retail establishment but rather separate businesses.
In the case of employees of an integrated chain store organization
whose activties in connection with imported goods occur between receipt
at the warehouse and subsequent distribution to the chain's retail outlets, if it is determined that the goods remain "in commerce" so as to
49

Walling v. L. Wiemann Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 602, cert.
denied 321 U.S. 785, 64 S. Ct. 782 (1944); Allesandro v. C. F. Smith Co., (C. C.
A. 6th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 75. In Walling v. Block, (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) 139 F.
(2d) 268, cert. denied 321 U.S. 788, 64 S. Ct. 787 (1944), the court said, "Whether
appellee's stores constitute a single establishment or whether each, in appropriate circumstances, is to be regarded as a separate establishment, is a question we need not
consider. All we decide is that the services involved were a mere incident to and an
integral part of the operation of each store in the group. Since the selling of no store
was substantially interstate, the employees in question [ warehouse and central office
employees] are excluded from coverage by§ 13(a) (2) of the Act." 139 F. (2d) 268
at 270. See also Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 255;
Vogelpohl v. Lane Drug Co., (D. C. Ohio 1944) 55 F. Supp. 564; Walling v. Fred
Wolferman, Inc., (D. C. Mo. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 917.
50
Allesandro v. C. F. Smith Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 75; Walling
v. GoJdblatt Bros., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 255.
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warrant a holding that the employees are "engaged in commerce"
within the meaning of the act, the further question arises as to whether
they are exempt as engaged in a retail establishment the greater part
of whose selling is in intrastate commerce. The final answer to this
question must await decision.by the Supreme Court.
3. Employees of a Manufacturer's or Supplier's Distributing Agency
The third type of fact situation where an out-of-state manufacturer
or supplier delivers goods to his local distributing agency for subsequent sale to local customers has arisen less frequently.
In De Loach v. Crowley's Inc.,5 1 the defendant purchased milk
and milk products for distribution at wholesale to local retail dairies.
Most of these products were purchased from an out-of-state concern
of which defendant was a corporate subsidiary with the same officers,
stockholders, and management as the parent corporation. Products
were delivered by truck to defendant and containers were transferred
to defendant's trucks as quickly as possible and delivered to its local
customers. The employees involved, who unloaded containers, reloaded them on defendant's trucks, and drove the latter's trucks in
making deliveries to local customers, contended that defendant was
merely an agent of the parent corporation in making deliveries. The
court, determining that whether plaintiffs were employed to a substantial extent in commerce under the act was a question deserving trial,
~d:
,

" ... If it [defendant] be a mere distributing agency of Crowley's Dairy Products [parent corporation], its customers are the
customers of its principal, and so is its business of local distribution.
Transmission of the goods frorp. New York to the customers would
not be broken by their receipt and handling by the distributing
agency." 52
51 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 378. See also Lorber v. Rosow, (D. C.
Conn. 1944) 8 W. H. Rep. 21, where the employer engaged in the wholesale drug
and liquor business in addition to purchasing goods on his own account acted as a factor
for suppliers in other states. The goods dealt with as a factor were mingled with and
handled in the same manner as goods purchased and sold by the employer except as to
method of payment. The court argued that there was no reason to hold that transactions
which would be intrastate in character under the Jacksonville case--sales within the
state from stocks of goods which h;i.ve come to rest in the warehouse-if made by a
local principal, should become interstate in nature because made by a factor or agent of
an out-of-state principal. The test would appear to be whether the interstate journey
has come to an end before the sale is made.
52
128 F. (2d) 378 at 379.
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The court here cited Binderup v. Pathe Agency,58 a decision under
the anti-trust act, in which it was held that delivery of films by an
out-of-state supplier to its own distribution agency for delivery to
lessees in the same state did not put an end to the interstate character
of the transaction, since the intermediate delivery to the agency did not
end and was not intended to end the movement of the commodity.
In the Jacksonville Paper Corwpany case, the Supreme Court-said:
" ... As in the case of an agency (cf. De Loach v. Crowley's
Inc . ... ) if the halt in the movement of the goods is a convenient
intermediate step in the process of getting them to their final
destinations, they remain 'in commerce' until they reach those
points. Then there is a practical continuity of movement of the
goods until they reach the customers for whom they are intended." H
The "practical continuity of movement" test of the J acksonwlle
Paper Company case would thus appear applicable to the distributing
agency situation. In the De Loach case, the halt in the movement of
the goods was short in duration because of their perishable nature.
Whether a longer halt would break the interstate journey would be
judged presumably by the standards discussed above with respect to
goods imported by independent wholesalers and chain store organizations.
B. Erwployees in Building Servicf! and Maintenance Activiites
The Supreme Court in Kirschbaum v. Walling 1515 held that building
maintenance employees of a landlord whose tenants were principally
engaged in production of goods for interstate commerce were within
the act, since the work of the employees had such a close and immediate
tie with the process of production by the tenants and was such an essential part of it that they were engaged in an occupation "necessary to
the production of goods for commerce." But the Court has not decided
a case involving employees performing similar activities in buildings
housing tenants "engaged in commerce" but not producing goods for
such commerce on the premises.
,
Lower courts have decided a large number of such cases, however,
and the decisions are virtually unanimous that building maintenance
employees, such as janitors, porters, elevator operators, and engineers,
158

263 U.S. 291, 44 S. Ct. 96 (1923).
317 U.S. 564 at 568, 63 S. Ct. 332 (1943).
1515
316 u. s. 517, 62 s. Ct. I II6 (1942).

11
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and watchmen are not within the scope of the act where no production
of goods for interstate commerce takes place in the building, even
though tenants may be engaged in interstate commerce.56 This position,
distinguishing the Kirschbaum holding, is based upon the view that a
narrower construction is to be given to "engaged in commerce" than to
"production of goods for commerce," because the act's definition of
the former, in contrast with its definition of the latter, does not include
"necessary" processes or occupations; hence coverage is broader for
employees engaged in servicing buildings in which production for interstate commerce is carried on than for employees servicing buildings in
which tenants are engaged in interstate commerce but not in production
for such commerce. The later cases 57 cite the Supreme Court holding
56
Building Service Employees International Union v. Trenton Trust Co., (C. C.
A. 3d, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 257; Blumenthal v. Girard Trust Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1944)
141 F. (2d) 849; Convey v. Omaha Nat. Bank, (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 140 F. (2d)
640, cert. denied 321 U. S. 781, 64 S. Ct. 638 (1944); Johnson v. Masonic Bldg.
Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 817, cert. denied 321 U. S. 780, 64 S. Ct.
621 (1944); Rucker v. First Nat. Bank of Miami, (C. C. A. 10th, 1943) 138 F. (2d)
699, cert. denied 321 U. S. 769, 64 S. Ct. 524 (1944); Lofther v. First Nat. Bank
of Chicago, (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 299; Rosenberg v. Semerio, (C. C. A.
9th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 742, cert. denied 320 U. S. 770, 64 S. Ct. 82 (1942); Tate
v. Empire Bldg. Corp., (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 743, cert. denied 320
U. S. 766, 64 S. Ct. 71 (1943); Cochran v. Florida Nat. Bldg. Corp., (C. C. A.
5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 615; Bozant v. Bank of New York, (D. C. N. Y. 1944)
8 W •. H. Rep. 68; Prescott v. Broadway & Franklin St. Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1944)
7 W. H. Rep. 1022; Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank, (D. C. N. Y. 1943)
7 W. H. Rep. 147; Hinkler v. Eighty-Three Maiden ~ane Corp., ·(D. C. N. Y.
1943) 50 F. Supp. 263; Cullen v. Stone & Webster Bldg. Inc., (D. C. N. Y. 1943)
7 W. H. Rep. 147; Wideman v. Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co., (D. C. Ga. 1943)
50 F. Supp. 626; Rieck v. Iowa Guarantee, Inc., (D. C. Iowa 1943) 6 W. H. Rep.
502; Greene v. Anchor Mills Co., (N. C. 1944) 8 W. H. Rep. 41; Stoike v. First Nat.
Bank, 290 N. Y. 195, 48 N. E. (2d) 482 (1943), cert. denied 320 :U.S. 762, 64
S. Ct. 50 (1943); Burke v. Hide & Leather Realty Co., 182 Misc. 319, 48 N. Y. S.
(2d) 594 (1944); Belies v. Penn. Bldg., Inc., 180 Misc. 1062, 45 N. Y. S. (2d)
6 (1943). For earlier cases see 41 M1cH. L. REV. 1060 at 1080 (194~).
In some of these cases maintenance workers were employed by an independent
contractor who supplied service on a contractual basis rather than by the landlord, but
this would not seem to be controlling, since the test of coverage is the relation of the
activities of the individual employee to interstate commerce or to the production of
goods for interstate commerce. See note 4, supra.
For the position of the Wage and Hour Division regarding application of the
act to maintenance and service· workers in office buildings occupied by tenants engaged
in interstate commerce see 6 yt. H. Rep. 1121-1122 (1943).
57
Blumenthal v. Girard Trust Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1944) 141 F (2d) 849;
Convey v. Omaha Nat. Bank, (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 140 F. (2d) 640, cert. denied
321 U.S. 781, 64 S. Ct. 638 (1944); Rucker v. First Nat. Bank of Miami, (C. C. A.
10th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 699, cert. denied 321 U. S. 769, 64 S. Ct. 524 (1944);
Rosenberg v. Semeria, (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 742, cert. denied 320 U.S.
770, 64 S. Ct. 82 (1943).
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in the McLeod case that "engaged in commerce" encompasses only
activities actually in the movement of commerce or so closely related
thereto as to be a part of it and conclude that employees performing
such activities as are here being considered cannot meet this test. 58
It has been urged that the establishment of a dual standard under
which employees performing similar work may be treated di:ff erently
depending upon whether tenants are engaged in interstate commerce
or in the production of goods for such commerce is not in consonance
with the economic realities which prompted the act; but where this
contention has been advanced, courts have met it by arguing that they
cannot disregard the definitive language employed by Congress in
framing the act. 59
·

C. Employees Constructing, Operating, Maintaining, and Repairing
Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce
In Walling 'V. Patton-Tulley Transportation Co.,6° the act was
held applicable to employees engaged in construction of dikes and
revetments in a river carrying interstate traffic. The lower court had
relied on Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & Saint PtllUl Railway
Company 61 in which it was decided that an employee of an interstate
railroad injured while engaged in cutting a tunnel was not employed
in commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, since the tunnel, beip.g only partly compieted, was not in use as
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The circuit court rejected
this position, however, on the ground that the river had long been a
highway of interstate commerce and the reasoning that construction
upon a highway not yet utilized for interstate commerce is not work
in interstate commerce, therefore, did not apply. In a recent district
court decision, 62 the Raymond case was relied on to exclude from the
58
In a dissenting opinion in Rosenberg v. Semerio, (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) 137
F. (2d) 742, it is argued that "The question is whether the services are a direct aid
to interstate commerce.... I can see no difference between the 'porters [who] keep
the buildings. clean and habitable' for the men and processes for the production of goods
for commerce held within the Act in Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling•.• and the janitor
who keeps the buildings clean and habitable for the men and processes in interstate
banking. I do not believe that McLeod v. Threlkeld overruled, sub silentio, Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling." 137 F. (2d) 742 at 744.
59
Convey v. Omaha Nat. Bank, (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 140 F. (2d) 640, cert.
denied 321 U. S. 781, 64 S. Ct. 638 (1944).
60
(C. C. A. 6th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 945•
61
243 U.S. 43, 37 S. Ct. 268 (1917).
62
Nieves v. Standard Dredging Co., (D. C. P. R. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 896.
See also Hewlett v. Del Balso Const. Corp., 180 Misc. 81, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 650
(1943); Shannon v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., (La. Ct. App. 1942) 5 W. H. Rep.
362; Woolfolk v. Orino (D. C. Ore. 1942) 5 W. H. Rep. 132.
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act's coverage dredging employees engaged in original construction of
a channel never previously used to facilitate interstate commerce.63 The
decided cases involving employees engaged in original construction of
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as distinct from maintenance
and repair of such instrumentalities, have been too few, however, to
settle the question of where the courts will draw the line between
original construction and m:aintenance and repair of existing facilities
and what principles will govern as to coverage in situations involving
original construction.
The act has been held applicable to employees engaged in operating
facilities, such as a toll road and drawbridge, a railroad line, and telephone lines, which constitute media for interstate movement of goods
and persons and communications and to employees maintaining such
facilities. 6 ¾ The activities of operation and maintenance employees are
actually in or so closely related to interstate movement of commerce
as to be a part of it. But the furnishing of board is too remote from
interstate commerce to bring within the scope of the act a cook employed by a commissary company to serve meals to maintenance-of-way
employees of an interstate railway carrier.65
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held the act
applicable to a maintenance er:µployee of ·a power company engaged in
63
"If the dredging here had been for the purpose of deepening a channel
already used for navigation or otherwise improving the facilities already in use a different conclusion might be reached." 7 W. H. Rep. 896.
6
¾ Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943) (employees operating and 'maintaining toll road and drawbridge over navigable waterway
which together constituted a medium for interstate movement of goods and persons);
Pedersen v. Fitzgerald Construction Co., 318 U. S. 740, 63 S. Ct. 558 (1943) (employees of independent contractor constructing new abutments and repairing substructures of bridges of interstate railroad); Rockton & Rion R. v. Walling, (C. C. A. 4th,
1944) 8 W. H. Rep. 12 (operation and maintenance eIJ?,ployees of short line railroad
operating wholly within a state but hauling goods shipped in interstate commerce);
Schmidt v. Peoples Telephone Union, (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 13 (operation employees of telephone company providing interstate communication); Smith v.
Public Utilities Co., (D. C. Ark. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 1090 (telephone switchboard
operator handling interstate messages); Rouch v. Continental Oil Co., (D. C. Kans.
1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 428 (employee at public airport maintained by aviation gasoline
company servicing airplanes operated on interstate flights); Walling v. Craig, (D. C.
Minn. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 479 (employees of highway construction company engaged
under contracts with states in reconstruction, repair, and maintenance of public roads
which were part of interstate highway network); Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone
Co., (D. C. Minn. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 898 ,(operation and maintenance employees of
telephone company providing interstate communication).
Western Union Telegraph_ Co. v. Lenroot, (U.S. 1945) 13 U.S. L. W. 4106,
involved the child labor provisions of the act.
65
McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
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generation of power and local sale to customers some of whom were
engaged in operating instrumentalities of interstate transportation and
communication.66· The court concluded that, while the employee was
not engaged in the actual movement of commerce, he performed work
so closely related thereto as to be "engaged in commerce" within the
test of the McLeod case.
" ... Closeness depends upon the essentiality and indespensability of the particular work or services performed to the actual
movement of commerce. . . . If a cessation of the services of thi
employee causes an interruption or interference with the free
movement of commerce, it is qrdinarily regarded as an essential
and indispensable part thereof." 67
The status of employees actually operating and maintaining the
media for interstate transportation and communication is thus reasonably clear; but there is still uncertainty as to what activities, if any,
beyond actual work upon the facilities for transportation and communication will be regarded as so closely related to the movement of interstate commerce as to be a part of it.68
In several cases involving employees operating, maintaining, and
repairing instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it has been urged
that the de minimis doctrine should apply where only a small portion
of .the tra_nsactions over such instrumentalities is interstate in character.
After the Supreme Court remanded the Overstreet 69 case to the district
66
New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel, (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) 145 F. (2d)
636. See also Allen v. Arizona Power Corp., (D. C. Arizona, 1943) 7 W. H. Rep. 395.
67
145 F. (2d) 636 at 638. The court also pointed out that the electrical energy
was not used to supply personal needs of employees, as was the food prepared by the
cook in the McLeod case, but was used in operating instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
68
ln his dissent in the McLeod case, Justice Murphy said: ''We have held that
a rate clerk employed by an interstate motor carrier [ Overnight Motor Transp. Co.
v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 1216 (1942)] and a seller of tickets on a toll
bridge over which interstate commerce moves [ Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 3 18
U.S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943)] are both 'engaged in commerce' within the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Yet, in the view of the majority of the Court, when
the employees' activities are in the field of transportation, the Act apparently will not
cover those who work in an interstate carrier's repair shop on facilities to supply power
for machinery used in repairing instrumentalities of transportation, [Shanks v. Del.,
L. & W. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 36 S. Ct. 188 (,1916) J or who heat cars and depots
used by interstate passengers, [Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bolle, 284 U. S. 74, 52
S. Ct. 59 (1931)] or who store fuel for the use of interstate vehicles, [Chicago &
E. I.~- Co. v. lndustriarComm. of Ill., 284 U. ~- 296, 52 S. Ct. 151 (1932)] or
who work on such vehicles when withdrawn for the moment from commerce for repairs [N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Bezue, 284 U. S. 415, 52 S. Ct. 205 (1932) ]."
319 U.S. 491 at 500-501, 63 S. Ct. 1248 (1943).
69
318 U.S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943).
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court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion, the latter
court determined that the employees engaged in maintaining and operating facilities over which interstate commerce moved were "engaged in
commerce" irrespective of the extent of interstate traffic. 70 The circuit
court, affirming the lower court, argued that the Supreme Court holding was based upon the fact of interstate use rather than upon the extent
of such use and held that employees operating and maintaining a toll
road and parallel telephone system, open at all times to interstate
traffic, the use of which by interstate traffic was neither occasional nor
accidental, were engaged in commerce within the meaning of the act
and that the amount of interstate traffic was immaterial.71 In meeting
defendant's contention that the "substantial part" formula of the Jacksonville Paper Company case should be applied, the court argued that
the law as laid down there is applicable to that class of cases which deals
with employees whose duties relate in part to interstate shipments, but
it is not ·applicable to cases dealing with employees having to do with
maintenance or operation of instrumentalities of commerce. Employees
of the first class engage during the same work-week in activities strictly
interstate in character and in activities strictly intrastate in character;
employees of the second class engage in the same type of activities
throughout the work-week. Employees operating and maintaining a
toll road and telephone system are not concerned with goods or persons
moving between states by means of instrumentalities of interstate and
intrastate transportation. Rather they are concerned with maintaining
and operating instrumentalities of transportation and communication
over which goods and persons in interstate and intrastate movements
alike are being transported and over which messages in interstate and
intrastat_e transactions alike are being transmitted. The toll road and
telephone line are links in national transportation and communication
systems, open and available at all times for interstate use. "If the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees engaged in
maintaining the one and in maintaining and operating the other depends
on the extent of the use of each in interstate commerce, then such use
70

Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., (D. C. Fla. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 503.
North Shore Corp. v. Barnett, (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 172. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. (U. S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 72. Subsequently the
judgment of the circuit court was vacated and the judgment of the district court was
modified in accordance with stipulations signed by counsel for the parties. (U. S. 1944)
65 S. Ct. 275. But since the stipulation modified the judgment of the district court
solely by reducing the amount of recovery of each plaintiff to two-thirds of the amount
awarded, the action of the Supreme Court would not appear to deprive the circuit court
decision of its weight as authority.
71
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would make coverage often depend on adventitious and remote factors,
at times even the weather." 72

II
EMPLOYEES "ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF GooDs FOR
COMMERCE"

A. Employees in the Physical Process of Production
In United States v. Darby,73 the Supreme Court stated that the
obvious purpose of the act was not only to prevent the interstate transportation of the proscribed product but also to stop the initial step
toward such transportation-production with the purpose of so transporting it. Congress, it argued, was not unaware that most manufac- '
turing businesses shipping their products in interstate commerce make
such products in their shops without reference to their ultimate destination and then after manufacture select some for interstate and some for
intrastate shipment according to the daily demands of their business.
It would be practically impossible, without disrupting manufacturing
business, to restrict the prohibited kind of production to the particular
items which later move in interstate rather than intrastate commerce.
"Production of goods for commerce," the Court held, includes at least
production of goods which, at the time of production, the employer,
according to the normal course of his business, intends or expects to
move in interstate commerce, although because of the demand situation
all of the goods may not subsequently actually enter interstate commerce. It is thus the facts at the time of production which determine
whether an employee is engaged in the production of goods for commerce and not any subsequent acts of the employer or of third parties.
The doctrine of the Darby case was stated with: reference to production of goods which, at the time of production, the employer in the
normal course of business intends or expects will move subsequently in
interstate commerce. But what of production or processing which takes
place after materials have entered the state from outside sources with
subsequent sale of the finished product locally? In this situation, coverage could be predicated only on the theory that production or processing operations occur while the imported goods remain a part of the
flow of interstate commerce. In light of the reasoning of the courts with
reference to goods of out-of-state origin, the act would seem inappli72 143 F. (2d) 172 at 174-175. In accord with the principal case on this point
are New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel, (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 636;
Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone Co., (D. C. Minn. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 898.
73
312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

cable in situations of this type on the ground that the imported goods
have com~ to rest within the_ state before activities of employees incident to production or processing occur.74 Coverage would extend, of
course, to employee~ whose activities involved procurement and receipt
of goods of out-of-state origin, since such employees would be "engaged in commerce."
The discussion above has considered only employees whose activities involve actual participation in the physical process of production;
but in addition to such employees, an enterprise typically will hire
clerical workers, janitors, watchmen, and others whose activities involve
no direct contact with physical production itself.
B. Employees not in the Physical Process of Production
The act provides that "an employee shall be deemed to have been
engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed in
producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any
other manner working on such goods, or in any process or occupation
necessary to the production thereof, in any State." 75 There is no requirement, therefore, that employees must themselves participate in
the physical process of production of goods before they can be regarded
as engaged in their production. 76 It is sufficient that the activities of
employees constitute a "process or occupation necessary to the production."
But what activities are "necessary" to production of goods for interstate commerce? In Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 11 it was urged that the
word "necessary" should be limited to the highly restrictive sense of
"indispensable," "essential," and."vital" and that a distinction must be
made between those processes and occupations which an employer finds
advantageous in his· own plan of production and those without which
he could not practically produce at all. In rejecting this contention, the
Supreme Court said:
"The argument would give an unwarranted rigidity to the
application of the word 'necessary,' which has always been recognized as a word to be harmonized with its context.•.. No hard and
fast rule will tell us what can be dispensed with in 'the production
of goods'. . . . What is required is a practical judgment as to
whether the particular employer actually operates the work as
part of an integrated effort for the production of goods." 78
74

West v. Aristocratic Dairy Products Co., (D. C. Ga. 1943) 6 W. H. Rep. 645.
Sec. 3(j), 5z Stat. L. 1061 (1938), z9 U.S. C. "(1940), § zo3 (j).
76
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S.-517, 6z S. Ct. 1116 (194z).
77
(U.S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 165, i:ehearing denied 13 U. s:L. W. 3z68 (1945).
78
65 S. Ct. 165 at 167.
75
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Activities, although not indispensable or essential to production of
goods, are "necessary" within the meaning of the act if they contribute
to economy or continuity of production. ". . . More is necessary to a
successful enterprise than that it be physically able to produce goods
for commerce. It also aims to produce them at a price at which it can
maintain its competitive place, and an occupation is not to be excluded
from the Act merely because it contributes to economy or to continuity
of production rather than to volume of production." 79
In Kirschbaum v. Walling, 80 holding the act applicable to building
maintenance employees of landlords whose tenants were principally
engaged on the premises in production of goods for interstate commerce, the Supreme Court construed broadly the statutory pxovisions
with respect to "production of goods for commerce." This broad construction was followed by the Supreme Court in later cases holding
within the scope of the act a watchman guarding a plant a substantial
portion of whose outpu~ was destined for shipment in interstate commerce 81 and auxiliary firemen of a private fire-fighting staff main65 S. Ct. 165 at 167.
316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1u6 (1942). The same result has been reached in
a large number of cases where production of goods for interstate commerce takes place
on the premises: Post v. Flemfog, (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 1206; Bittner
v. Chicago Daily News Printing Co., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. u23; Cahn v.
Butler Bldg. Corp., (D. C. Ill. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 1086; Simmons v. Straight
Improvement Co., (D. C. N. Y. 19H) 7 W. H. Rep. 1060; Frank v McMeekan,
(D. C. N. Y. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 828; Schmidt v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,
(D. C. N. Y. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 623; Berry v. 34 Irving Place .Corp., (D. C.
N. Y. 1943) 52F. Supp. 875; Rienzo v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., (N. Y. 1944)
7 W. H. Rep. 718; Gelles v. Newburgh Sav. Bank, (N. Y. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 431;
O'Donnell v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., (N. Y. City Ct. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep.
932; Schineck v. 386 Fourth Ave. Corp., (N. Y. City Ct. 1944) 49 N. Y. S. (2d)
872; Floyd v. 58-64 Fortieth Street Corp., (N. Y. City Ct. 1943) 44 N. Y. S. (2d)
422. In Martinov. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1944) 145 F.
(2d) 163, cert. applied for 13 U. S. L. W. 3294 (1945), the court rffused to accept
the contention that employees of a window cleaning company who washed windows of
manufacturing establishments were •engaged in production of goods for commerce.
81
Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U. S. 540, 64 S. Ct. 320 (1944). The
Supreme Court of Mississippi had held that the watchman was not eng~ed in production of goods for commerce nor in an occupation necessary thereto since he was engaged
in no manual activities connected with production which was carried on when he was
not on duty; he performed no duties other than those of watchman; and he was not
specially employed to guard goods assembled for manufacture or awaiting shipment in
interstate commerce. Southern Package Corp. v. Walton, 194 Miss. 573, 11 S. (2d)
912 (1943). The Supreme Court held that under its decision in the Kirschbaum case,
no one of these facts, nor all of them together, could support the conclusion reached
below. See also Cushway v. Stork Engineering Co. Inc., (C. C. A. 6th, 1944) 142
F. (2d) 463; Deutsch v. Heywood-Wakefield Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1943) 6 W. H.
Rep. 546. For earlier cases, see 41 Mica. L. REv. 1060 at 1079 (1943). The same
result has been reached where the watchman is employed by an independent contractor
70
80
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tained by a manufacturer doing interstate business.82 The activities of
these employees were regarded as having a sufficiently "close and immediate tie with the process of production" to be "necessary" to such
production within the meaning of the act.
As indicated earlier, lower courts generally have limited the doctrine of the Kirschbaum case to those employees whose maintenance
aetivities are performed in buildings housing tenants producing on the
premises goods for interstate commerce and have refused to extend
cov~rage to maintenance workers in buildings housing tenants engaged
in interstate commerce. The refusal of the Supreme Court to review
a number of such cases 83 has left in effect these holdings, with the result
that there is a dual standard depending upon whether tenants are engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce.
The question of whether maintenance workers in buildings housing
only the executive staff of a company producing elsewhere goods for
interstate commerce are within the act was presented in Borella v.
Borden Co.,84 recently decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. No actual production took place in the building where
the maintenance workers were employed 85 and administrative and
executive officers housed in the building did not come into physical
contact with the goods at any stage of their production. Under the
doctrine of the McLeod case, these employees were not engaged in
interestate commerce and coverage, therefore, had to be predicated upon
supplying watch service to customers engaged in production of goods for interstate
commerce. Walling v. New Orleans Private Patrol Service, Inc., (D. C. La. 1944)
57 F. Supp. 143; Walling v. Lum, (D. C. Miss. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 570; Walling
v. Fox-Pelletier International ·Detective Agency, Inc., (D. C. Tenn. 1944) 7 W. H.
Rep. 553; Haley v. Central Watch Service, (D. C. Ill. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 14+;
Walling v. Wattam, (D. C. Tenn. 1943) 6 W. H. Rep. I I 19. In Noonan v. Fruco
Construction Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 140 F. (2d) 633, the act was held inapplicable to watchm.en employed to guard a plant under construction which was "specially
designed" _for the manufacture of munitions to be .shipped in interstate commerce on
the ground that the watchmen's activities were in an occupation necessary to the production of the plant rather than to the production of munitions for commerce. Similarly in Lyons v. H.K. Ferguson Co., (La. Ct. App. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 240, the
act was held inapplicable to a watchman employed by an engineering company engaged in construction of buildings to be used in processing raw materials intended to be
shipped in interstate commerce.
82
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, (U. S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 165, rehearing denied 13
U.S. L. W. 3268 (1945).
88 See note 56, supra.
84
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 63, cert. granted 13 U. S. L. W. 3268
(1945).
85
The portion of the building not occupied by the administrative staff of the
Borden Co. was leased to others who did not produce goods for interstate commerce
on the premises.
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their being engaged in production of goods for such commerce. The
court, after pointing out that under the Kirschbaum holding these
employees would be engaged in production of goods for interstate commerce when they cared for quarters of those manufacturing or handling goods because those who make or handle goods are so engaged
and caretakers' work is "necessary" to their activities, argued that these
employees were nearer to "production" in one respect than those in the
Kirschbaum case in that they were employed directly by the manufacturer instead of by the manufacturer's lessor; but they were farther
from "production" if that term must be confined to actual contact with
the raw material or the finished product. ". . . But it seems to us that
the circumstance that administrative officials do not come in physical
contact with the goods at any stage of their production, could not have
been thought relevant to the object to be attained. We can conjure
up no reason that could have induced Congress, having included employees who made tenantable the quarters of_ artisans and shipping
clerks, to exclude those who made tenantable the quarters of the president, the managers, the cashiers, superintendents and the rest." 86 Accordingly, the court concluded that persons who comprise management
as well as those physically engaged in the manufacture of goods are so
engaged in production as defined by the act to bring maintenance employees of the office building in which management is located within
the scope of the act. The same court subsequently concluded that, in
determining whether a substantial portion of tenants were engaged in
production of goods for commerce, executive and sales offices of concerns carrying on elsewhere mining and manufacturing businesses were
to be regarded as occupied by those engaged in production of goods
for commerce.81
Circuit courts of appeals' in two circuits have held within the scope
of the act cooks engaged in preparing food for logging and pulpwood
cutting crews where products subsequently manufactured from the ,
logs and pulpwood moved in interstate commerce. 88 The work of the
cooks was regarded as a process or occupation necessary to the production of lumber and pulpwood products destined to move interstate. As
indicated above, a cook serving meals to a maintenance-of-way crew of
86

145 F. (2d) 63 at 65.
Callus v. 10 E. 40th St. Bldg., (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 1208, cert.
applied for, 13 U.S. L. W. 328Q (1945). Cf. Rucker v. First Nat. Bank of Miami,
(C. C. A. 10th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 699, cert. denied 321 U. S. 769, 64 S. Ct. 524
(1944); Cnllen v. Stone & Webster Bldg., Inc., (D. C. N. Y. 1943) 7 W. H. Rep.
147.
88
Hanson v. Lagerstrom, (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 120; Consolidated
Timber Co. v. Womack, (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) 132 F.(2d) IOI.
87
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an interstate railroad was held to be outside the act. in the McLeod
case on the ground that his activities were not actually in or so closely
related to the movement of commerce as to be a part of it. But "the
test of whether one is in commerce is obviously more exacting than the
test of whether his occupation is necessary to production for commerce." 89 In a recent district court decision,9° the act was held inapplicable to employees of an independent contrac;tor operating eating places
located at manufacturing plants to serve only workers there employed.
The court argued that furnishing of food was not necessary to production of goods in the plants, but rather the employees were supplying
personal needs of the workers. The case was distinguished from the
two cases involving cooks preparing food for crews engaged in lumbering operations on the ground that there the cookhouses were an integral
part of the business of the employer and maintained as a part ·of its ·
business. Here, on the other :(land, the eating places were operated for
profit by an independ~nt contractor as separate establishments; the food
was sold not as a company service but for the convenience of the plant
employees; and there was no showing that the services rendered by
these independent establishments were a means whereby the manufacturer accomplished the purpose of its existence. "The court is convinced that in cases where the production of goods is in an isolated
spot where board cannot be readily obtained by employees, that it
would be necessary for the company to furnish board to its employees,
and in such cases the furnishing of the board would be a necessary part
of the production of the goods. But where an independent contractor
furnishes and makes available a service to employees of a plant and it
is not shown that this service is a part" of the manufacturer's business,
then the service in furnishing food and refreshments id for the convenience but not necessity of the employees of the manufacturer, and
service is not bound by such a close tie as makes the service thus made
available to the plant employees necessary to the production of the
goods." 91 There is no sound basis upon which the act's coverage can
be extended to employees whose services satisfy needs of workers engaged in production of goods for interstate commerce when such needs
are entirely personal and arise independently of the production process
rather than in connection with that process, but in practice this distinction is sometimes difficult to draw.92
89
9

Armour & Co. v. Wantock, (U.S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 165 at 167-168.

°Kuhn v. Canteen Food Service, (D. C. Ill. 1944) 8 W. H. Rep. 12.

8 W. H. Rep. 12 at 15.
See Castaing v. Puerto Rican American Sugar Refinery, (C. C. A. 1st, 1944)
145 F. (2d} 403.
91

92
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The cases so far discussed, while indicating the factors regarded as
material in particular situations, do not yield any all-embracing formula
to determine when the relation of an activity to production of goods
for interstate commerce is sufficiently tenuous to preclude employees
from the benefits of the act. But it is clear that courts in general have
inclined to liberal construction of the phrase "production of goods for
commerce," laying down less exacting tests than in the case of employees where coverage is predicated upon their being "engaged in
commerce," because of the inclusion of necessary processes or occupations in the statutory definition of production.

C. Interstate Commerce Once Removed
The test of coverage where the employee's work is necessary for·
production of goods for commerce is not whether the goods are shipped
interstate by the employer but whether the goods are intended for
interstate commerce directly or through an intermediary.98 Thus sale
of a product by the original producer at the place of production does
not necessarily constitute a transaction complete in itself without reference to activities of purchasers so as to insulate the producer from
application of the act. The question is whether the producer knows or
has reason to know that his product will be shipped interstate by himself or by others. In the event that further processing takes place after
local sale by the original producer, the goods of the original producer
form a "part or ingredient" 94 of the finished product moving interstate
and his employees are performing the first steps in a series of operations that produce articles going into commerce.
On the basis of this reasoning, the act has been held applicable to
employees of concerns making containers destined to be used by local
purchasers for shipment of their products interstate; 95 ~o employees of
companies supplying electricity and water to loeal customers who are
engaged in production of goods for interstate commerce; 96 and to em93 Dize v. Maddrix, (C. C. A. 4th, 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 827; cert. granted 13
U.S. L. W. 3204 (1944), but limited to questions not material to this point; Wagner
v. American Service Co., (D. C. Iowa 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 1121.
94 The act [§ 3 (i)] defines goods as meaning "goods, .•. wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part
or ingredient thereof...." 52 Stat. L. 1061 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (194-0), § 203(i).
95
Dize v. Maddrix, (C. C. A. 4th, 194-4-) 7 W. H. Rep. 827, cert. granted
13 U. S. L. W. 3204 (1944) but limited to questions not material to this point;
Walling v. Villahme Box & Lumber Co., (D. C. Minn. 1943) 6 W. H. Rep. 544.
For earlier cases, see 41 M1cH. L. REV. 1060 at 1082 (1943).
96
Reynolds v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n., (C. C. A. 9th, 1944) 143
F. (2d) 863, cert. denied (U.S. 1944) 65 S. Ct. 117; Allen v. Arizona Power Corp.,
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ployees of companies manufacturing ice for local sale to customers for
refrigeration of interstate shipments of perishable products.97

III
CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF FACILITIES USED IN PRODUCTION

Goons FOR COMMERCE
A. New Construction ·
Courts generally have taken the position that employees engaged
in new construction are not within the scope of the act, even though
building materials used in the construction have come from out-of-state
sources.98 The reasoning here seems to be that the local construction
project is not yet in use for the production of goods for interstate commerce and any out-of-state materials used in construction come to rest
upon delivery at the building site. The act has been held to apply, however, to employees engaged in shipping, transporting and unloading
building materials, tools, and equipment moving in interstate or foreign commerce.99 Such employees are concerned with the movement of
goods which have acquired an interstate situs and consequently they
are "engaged in commerce."
OF

B. Maintenance and Repair
Employees engaged in repairing buildings and machinery used in
producing goods for interstate commerce appear to be within the act.100
Maintenance and repair of buildings and equipment actively in use in
production of goods for interstate commerce are clearly occupations
necessary to the production of goods for interstate commerce. The
more troublesome case is where it is not clear that plant facilities presently not in use are to be usec:!, after repair .for production of goods
(D. C. Arizona 1943) 7 W. H. Rep. 395; Richardson v. Delaware Housing Ass'n.,
(D. C. Fla. 1943) 6 W. H. Rep. 473·
1l7 Chapman v. Home Ice Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 353, cert.
denied 320 U. S. 761, 64 S. Ct. 72 (1943); Wagner v. American Service Co., (D. C.
Iowa 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. 1121; Anderson v. Atlantic Co., (D. C. Ga. 1943) 6
W. H. Rep. 671.
98 Wells v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, (C. C. A. 6th, 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. u74;
Barbe v. Cummins Const. Corp., (C. C. A. 4th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 667; Scott v.
Ford, Bacon & Davis Inc., (D. C. Pa. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 982; Trefs v. Foley Bros.,
(D. C. Mo. 1943) 6 W. H. Rep. 921. See also Noonan v. Fruco Const. Co., (C. C.
A. 8th, 1943) 140 F. (2d) 633.
99 Clyde v. Broderick, (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 348; Simpkins v.
Elmhurst Contracting Co., 181 Misc. 791, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 26 (1944); Steiner v.
Pleasantville Constructors, (N. Y. 1944) 7 W. H. Rep. II26.
100 Walling v. Roland Electrical Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1945) 8 W. H. Rep. 82. See
6 W. H. Rep. 122; 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1080 at 1086 (1943).
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for interstate commerce rather than for purposes purely local in charatcer.101
CONCLUSIONS

No all-embracing formula has been laid down by the courts to
determine when employees are within the scope of the act. In view of
the employee test of coverage, the scope of the act can be determined
only by the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion applied to a
wide variety of fact situations. This process of blocking out·the area of
federal wage and hour regulation under the act on a case-by-case basis
requires decision of a large number of cases before the act's coverage
is fully determined. The status of certain types of employees under
the act is now settled; the status of others must await future decisions.
Courts generally have applied a more exacting test in determining
whether employees are engaged in commerce than in determining
whether they are engaged in production of goods for commerce because
of the inclusion processes or occupations in the statutory definition
of the latter phrase. The test laid down in the McLeod case limits
employments in commerce to activities actually in or so closely related
to the movement of commerce as to be a part of it. Where it has been
urged upon courts that the establishment of a dual standard leads to
· results which are unsatisfactory from an economic standpoint, the answer generally has been that the courts cannot disregard the definitive
language of Congress and indulge in an "expansion of meaning which
properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation."
The act reaches production of goods before interstate movement
has begun, extending backward to employees of the producers of goods
intended in the normal course of business to move immediately in interstate commerce and to employees of the producers of goods which are a
part or ingx:edient of the goods of another or whose goods are further
processed by another who in the normal course of business would ship
them interstate It applies to those actually engaged in the physical
processes of production; to those whose activities are necessary to production; and to those who actually operate and maintain essential
instrumentalities by which interstate commerce is conducted. No hard
and fast rule can be laid down to determine what is necessary to production of goods for interstate commerce; rather what is required is
a practical judgment as to whether the particular employer actually
operates the work as part of an integrated e:ffort for the production of
goods.
101 Cf. Weaver v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1944) 8 W. H. Rep.
16, and Walling v. Craig, (D. C. Minn. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 479, where this question
is raised with respect to employees "engaged in commerce."
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The act reaches forward to the distributive functions, covering at
least employees of independent wholesalers a substantial part of whose
activities involve procurement or receipt of goods from out of st'ate
and handling or delivering to local customers goods of out-of-state
origin pursuant to either special orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers and warehouse employees of chain stores
engaged in ordering and procuring goods from other states and ·unloading and checking them before they are deposited on the unloading
platform of the warehouse. There is still uncertainty, however, as to
the status of warehouse employees of independent wholesalers and
chain store organizations whose activities are performed in connection
with goods of out-of-state origin between receipt at the warehouse and
subsequent local distribution either to independent retailers or to the
chain's own retail outlets. The Supreme Court has indicated that, in
the absence of special orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings
with customers, the course of business of .an independent wholesaler
might be such as to establish that practical continuity in transit necessary to keep a movement of goods in commerce within the meaning
of the act; but what ev.idence would be necessary to establish such a
course of business i,s not clear. This practical continuity in transit test,
although stated by the Supreme Court with respect to an independent
wholesaler, would seem equally applicable to the chain store situation
or to the distributing agency. It may be argued that, from an economic
standpoint, "wholesale distribution is, by its very nature, in the stream
of commerce running from manufacturers .and producers through
, wholesaFng channels to retailers or to industrial consumers [and] to
hold that commerce ceases when the goods received from outside the
state are unloaded, to stay in the warehouse temporarily, is to set up
legal fiction without relation tq economic realities." 102 Acceptance of
the theory that goods of out-of-state origin remain in the stream of
interstate commerce until they reach their ultimate destination-the
independent local retail outlet or the importer's own local retail outlet
-and employees handling such goods are within the scope of the act
until the goods reach this ultimate destination intended or contemplated by the importer when he set in motion the interstate shipment
would avoid the necessity of examining the course of business of the
importer and would extend the benefits of the act to all employees
performing substantially similar work. But the courts have not been
willing to lay down any such all-embracing rule. ·
102 Weiss, "Economic Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act," 58 Q.
460 at 474 (1944).
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